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ABSTRACT 
The rivalry between China and India poses significant challenges for the regional security 
of Southeast Asia, and particularly for the security of Burma. Within the context of their 
rivalry, China and India compete over oil and gas resources in Burma. They seek not only 
to establish energy security for their own countries, but to reaffirm an economic and 
political presence in the region. This thesis will explore the impact of China and India’s 
pursuit of energy resources on Burma’s domestic and foreign politics. It will show how, 
over the last few years, the competitive agendas of these two countries over the natural 
resources in Burma, has strengthened the military junta in the country. In particular, it 
will detail how, with the revenues from selling its energy resources, the government of 
Burma is able to operate with relative autonomy and impunity in formulating 
authoritarian domestic policies and pursuing foreign policy. It suggests that progress on 
democratization and liberalization in Burma is likely to occur more slowly as a result of 
this access to energy revenue.  
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I. THE IMPACT OF SINO-INDIAN ENERGY SECURITY 
AMBITIONS ON BURMA’S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLITICS 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The rivalry between China and India poses significant challenges for the regional 
security of Southeast Asia, and particularly for the security of Burma. Because of the 
“dangerous rise in mutual suspicion between India and China,” the two countries 
compete for an advantageous political and economic position in the region.1 Specifically, 
the countries disagree over their respective alliances and role in Southeast Asia. India is 
suspicious of the “strategic alliance between China and Pakistan.”2  Similarly, the 
relationship between India and the United States threatens the Chinese, as they strive for 
preeminence in the region.3 Within the context of their rivalry, China and India compete 
over oil and gas resources in Burma. They seek not only to establish energy security for 
their own countries but to reaffirm an economic and political presence in the region. 
This thesis will explore the impact of China and India’s pursuit of energy 
resources on Burma’s domestic and foreign politics. It will show how, over the last few 
years, the competitive agendas of these two countries, over the natural resources in 
Burma, has strengthened the military junta in the country. In particular, it will detail how, 
with the revenues from selling its energy resources, the government of Burma is able to 
operate with relative autonomy and impunity in formulating authoritarian domestic 
policies and pursuing foreign policy. Therefore, this thesis will specifically answer the 
following question: What are the impacts of the Sino-Indian energy security competition 
in Burma on its domestic and foreign politics? 
                                                 
1 Renaud Egreteau, “The Breakout of China-India Strategic Rivalry in Asia and the Indian Ocean,” 
Asian Survey 48, no.6 (2008): 937. 
2 Egreteau, “Breakout of China-India Strategic Rivalry,” 937. 
3 Egreteau, “Breakout of China-India Strategic Rivalry,” 937. 
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B. IMPORTANCE  
The scale of China and India’s need for new energy sources is already 
remarkable, and looks like it will only become more so. With increasing industrialization, 
Southeast Asia “is anticipated to account for 42 % of total growth in demand for natural 
gas from 2002 to 2030.”4 Both China and India are seeking alternative sources of energy 
to mitigate the effects of their growing populations and infrastructure. For example, 
India’s energy demands have been steadily increasing, and India’s “demand will increase 
from 33m tonnes of oil equivalent (toe), or 5.5% of the overall primary-energy mix in 
2007, to around 113m toe by 2030, more than 10% of the total.”5 Both China and India 
have increased their engagement in the region in an effort to establish diversity in their 
supplies of oil and gas. Bradsher notes that “government-owned Chinese oil companies 
have been busy in the last two years buying large stakes in gas fields in Indonesia and 
Australia.”6   
The intention by China and India to extract energy resources from Burma is of 
concern for two reasons. First, what will the overall effects be on Burma’s domestic 
politics, especially the survival of its authoritarian regime? Domestically, it is already 
true that “large-scale natural gas projects have directly and indirectly led to violations of 
basic human rights with the complicity of multinational corporate actors.”7 Because oil 
and gas exports in 2007 were “equivalent to around 15% of the country’s GDP,” the 
Burmese regime has had little reason to comply with international pressures to change its 
approach to governance and civil society.8  
Second, the interest and competition over Burma’s resources by its two powerful 
neighbors have empowered the Burmese military junta to disregard any “international 
                                                 
4 Benjamin K. Sovacool, “Reassessing Energy Security and the Trans-ASEAN Natural Gas Pipeline 
Network in Southeast Asia,” Pacific Affairs 82, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 468. 
5 Ian Lewis, “India’s Shifting Gas Strategy” Petroleum Economist (April 2010). 
6 Keith Bradsher, “Alert to Gains by China, India Is Making Energy Deals,” New York Times, January 
17, 2005. 
7 Matthew F. Smith and Naing Htoo, “Energy Security: Security for Whom?” Yale Human Rights and 
Development L.J. Vol. 11(2008): 219. 
8 Economist. Myanmar’s Pipeline Politics. March 23, 2007. 
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censure or intervention,” again because the oil and gas revenue allows the leadership to 
govern irrespective of the consequences.9 Moreover, “most of the junta’s military support 
has come from China and India, countries with an active interest in exploiting Burma’s 
natural resources, particularly oil and gas.”10 This affirmation of the strategic importance 
of Burma to China and India makes the regime less vulnerable to sanctions imposed by 
the United States, the European Union, and the rest of the international community. 
The overall significance of this thesis is when a military junta such as Burma, 
with countless human rights violations and questionable security policies, strengthens as 
a result of the energy security investments by China and India. Sovacool reaffirms that 
“the consolidation and extraction of natural resources can create and solidify asymmetries 
in wealth that then contribute to rising income gaps between the rich and poor, 
institutionalize corruption, and enable oppressive regimes to maintain their political 
power.”11 We can see that this has already started to happen in Burma: the Economist 
reports, for instance, that the 900 kilometer pipeline to China not only “enhance(s) 
China’s interest in maintaining the political status quo in Myanmar, but dim(s) the 
prospects for democratization” in Burma.12 This thesis explores this dynamic in Burma, 
looking to ongoing consequences. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The primary issue this thesis addresses is the effect of energy security policies on 
the host nation’s domestic and foreign politics. Specifically, I will examine how 
investments in energy resources by China and India directly affect Burma’s domestic 
stability and political relationships with its neighbors. Burma is managed by a corrupt 
military junta that has little regard for either its populace or its foreign relationships in the 
region. The government’s primary focus, like that of other oppressive regimes, is to 
                                                 
9 Economist. Myanmar’s Pipeline Politics. Mar. 23, 2007. 
10 Smith and Htoo, “Energy Security: Security for Whom?” 221. 
11 Benjamin K. Sovacool, “The political economy of oil and gas in Southeast Asia: heading towards 
the natural resource curse?” Pacific Review 23, no. 2 (May 2010): 226. 
12 Economist. Myanmar’s Pipeline Politics. Mar. 23, 2007. 
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remain in power. Its access to oil and gas revenue allows it to continue its oppressive 
policies and operate with relative autonomy, regardless of international pressure. 
In evaluating Burma, I will rely on the concept of the rentier state. Okruhlik 
characterizes “a rentier state (as one that) depends on external sources for a large portion 
of its revenue.”13 Most often associated with countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa, “since they derive a large fraction of their revenues…in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
and the United Arab Emirates” from oil and gas, the concept is applicable to the similar 
situation in Burma.14 In Burma, revenue received from oil and gas for 2005 was “US 
$1.4bn… or 37% of the country’s total export revenue.”15 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that regime’s autonomy in Burma will increase as 
its access to energy rent grows. Like Okruhlik, Beblawi asserts that external revenue 
generated from oil rents often either hinders the domestic infrastructure of a country or 
empowers only the state-run corporations which have absolute control over the economic 
progress of the nation.16 Indeed, in Burma, the revenue obtained from the oil and gas 
relationships with China and India has reinforced state autonomy in Burma, empowering 
the military junta. As Ulfelder asserts, dependence on a significant amount of external 
rent from oil and gas translates to a regime “substantially less likely to transition to 
democracy.”17 Again, the external rent has strengthened the Burmese regime, which in 
turn somewhat resists domestic and international pressures to transition to a more 
moderate form of government. A country such as Burma, with this type of leverage, can 
present challenges to the regional security initiatives in part because of the regime’s 
ability to exist in relative isolation.  
                                                 
13 Gwenn Okruhlik, “Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political Economy 
of Oil States,” Comparative Politics 31, no.3 (Apr. 1999): 295. 
14 Michael L. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53, No.3 (Apr. 2001): 329. 
15 Economist. Myanmar’s Pipeline Politics. Mar. 23, 2007. 
16 Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” 331. 
17 Jay Ulfelder, “Natural-Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracy,” Comparative Political 
Studies 40, no. 8 (August 2007): 996. 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Two primary themes have become evident. First, China’s and India’s energy 
security role in Burma and the philosophy these two nations adopt. Second, how the 
regime in Burma’s enjoys some autonomy through its access of energy revenue, and how 
this relationship characterizes Burma as a rentier state in Southeast Asia. The current 
literature by scholars interested in the first theme, the dynamics between energy and 
security, is diverse. Equally prominent is the discourse on the second, that is, specifically 
concerning the interest of China and India in Burma’s natural gas and oil reserves. China 
is interested in the access to a maritime port that would bypass the heavily commercially 
congested Malacca Strait between Indonesia and Thailand. Within this context, this thesis 
examines the effects of an increased oil and gas revenue for Burma and carefully 
illustrates the consequences on domestic and foreign politics.  
1. China and India’s Energy Security Policies 
It is important to first establish a general definition of energy security as a basis 
for evaluating the resource relationship between China, India, and Burma. Yergin broadly 
defines energy security as “simply the availability of sufficient supplies for affordable 
prices.”18 He further adds that each country “interprets what the concept means to them 
differently”; highlighting that for China and India energy security “now lies in their 
ability to rapidly adjust to their new dependence on global markets, which represents a 
major shift away from their commitment for self sufficiency.”19  
This approach to the definition of energy security is different from others because 
of its generality and flexibility. Whereas other definitions focus specifically on oil and 
gas imports or exports, and the balance of the global energy market, Yergin’s definition 
recognizes two important distinctions. First, it acknowledges that energy security is 
unique to every country and to their overall national policies. Second, it assumes that 
energy security evolves in reaction to the energy supply, regional relationships, and 
                                                 
18 Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (Mar/Apr 2006): 70. 
19 Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” 70. 
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internal stressors of each country.20 By utilizing this flexible perspective, this thesis will 
be able to address the energy security agendas of China and India in Burma. 
Both China and India have well-developed policies geared toward enhancing the 
energy security of their nations. The pursuit of alternative energy supplies is a core 
component of the Chinese national security agenda. Policies are shaped by core advisors 
who recommend to the leadership which course of action should be adopted. The current 
course of action is articulated in the phrase “peaceful rise” which illustrates China’s 
approach to development and investment in other countries.21 The core of this philosophy 
is that “China’s development will not pose a threat to any other country, but instead will 
be mutually beneficial and sustainable.”22 The pursuit of alternative energy supplies is a 
core component of the Chinese national security agenda.  
China’s policy on achieving energy security by buying Burmese energy is shaped 
by their ability to feel “less uncomfortable overlooking the junta’s misrule within its 
borders.”23 Thus China, in some instances, has ignored the internal unrest of Burma in 
order to secure energy contracts. Smith and Htoo, in their Burmese Human Rights article, 
note that the Chinese actually supported the military junta at the United Nations Security 
Council in 2007 in their “veto of a (the) United Nations Security Council resolution that 
would have resulted in UNSC-supported action in Burma prior to the country’s brutal 
crackdown on monks and prodemocracy activists.” 24 
Indeed, China’s relationship with Burma is assertive and very beneficial for the 
governments/elites of both countries. Burma has always seemed to view China with a 
“preferential status” grateful for the “political support in the international community.25 
As a result, “more than two thirds of FDI has been made in hydrocarbons projects over 
                                                 
20 Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” 70. 
21 Smith and Htoo, “Energy Security: Security for Whom?” 252. 
22 Smith and Htoo, “Energy Security: Security for Whom?” 252. 
23 Economist. Myanmar’s Pipeline Politics. Mar. 23, 2007. 
24 Smith and Htoo, “Energy Security: Security for Whom?” 252. 
25 Petroleum Economist. “Pipeline Strengthens Sino-Burmese Ties.” Aug. 2009. 
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the last three years” in Burma by Chinese companies.26 China wants to secure other 
avenues of oil and gas supply through Burma because it will “lessen its dependence on 
this route (Strait of Malacca) for its essential energy supplies.”27 The Sino-Burmese 
relationship is thus important for both parties: it not only provides some political 
coverage for Burma, but alleviates China’s energy security concerns.  
India also has adopted a policy geared toward increasing not only its regional 
presence but also focused on establishing energy security. Mohan establishes that India, 
like China, embraced a “Look East” policy in 1992 whose goal was “not merely an 
external economic policy; it was also a strategic shift in India’s vision of the world and 
India’s place in the evolving global economy.”28 Currently, the Look East policy of India 
is still a cornerstone of their perspective when managing the relationships in Southeast 
Asia. With regard to its policy toward Burma, India has taken what can be surmised as a 
more practical stance with the leadership of Burma since 2003. Smith and Htoo show that 
India has broken from its “previous support of Burma’s prodemocracy movement, instead 
opting to engage the junta on several fronts, including an increase in investments in oil 
and gas.”29 In 2008, India referred to a “relationship with the junta as close and 
friendly.”30 The policy toward Burma is an economic necessity, primarily motivated by 
establishing Indian energy security. Burma, “with its annual oil production pegged at 50 
million barrels—can play a pivotal role in India’s energy security strategy.”31India thus 
focuses on the economic prospects that are beneficial for both countries, choosing not to 
interfere in the domestic politics of Burma. 
                                                 
26 Petroleum Economist. “Pipeline Strengthens Sino-Burmese Ties.” Aug. 2009. 
27 The Christian Science Monitor. “What Stigma? Burma (Myanmar) draws energy-hungry 
neighbors.” July 2, 2010. 
28 As summarized by: C. Raja Mohan, “India’s Geopolitics and Southeast Asian Security,” Southeast 
Asian Affairs, (2008): 46. 
29 Smith and Htoo, “Energy Security: Security for Whom?” 256. 
30 The Indian Ministry of External Affairs referred to this relationship: Smith and Htoo, “Energy 
Security: Security for Whom?” 256. 
31 Saurabh Shukla, “Supping with the Junta; Even as the cry for democracy rings out in Yangon, a 
pragmatic India sides with the Generals to safeguard strategic interests” India Today, Oct.8, 2007.  
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In many ways, China and India have adopted similar approaches to Burma, and 
this similarity perhaps heightens their rivalry in the region.32 These neighboring 
countries have decided that the pursuit and acquisition of the natural resources in Burma 
are more important than pushing that country to adopt more moderate policies in 
governance. The competition over Burma’s natural resources is a key component of this 
thesis. To counteract China’s economic presence in the region, “India feels that it needs 
to improve its relations with Myanmar.” 33 India, perhaps in response to China’s 
investment, has invested in Burma “U.S. $120 million to develop the Arakan capital of 
Sittwe as an economic center.”34  
2. Burma as a Rentier State 
The competition over natural resources in contemporary Burma has become an 
important issue in Southeast Asia. Burma plays a central role within the agenda of China 
and India’s energy security because of the social and political implications of the oil and 
gas investment in the country. As previously addressed, the increase of oil and gas 
revenue has lead to an increase in autonomy for the Burmese regime. Not only can it 
pursue its own agenda on a variety of issues without some fear of threat, it can actively 
use others’ dependence on its resources as leverage for that agenda. For instance, 
Sovacool asserts that Burma supported the Trans-ASEAN Natural Gas Pipeline (TAGP) 
because “it enhances its ability to influence international and geopolitical relations.”35 
Furthermore, Burma has had instances wherein they have used the “natural gas reserves 
to gain concessions from China, India, and others within ASEAN.”36 
                                                 
32 Marie Lall, “Indo-Myanmar Relations in the Era of Pipeline Diplomacy,” Contemporary Southeast 
Asia 28, no.3 (Dec. 2006): 435. 
33 Marie Lall, “Indo-Myanmar Relations in the Era of Pipeline Diplomacy,” Contemporary Southeast 
Asia 28, no.3 (Dec. 2006): 435. 
34 Smith and Htoo, “Energy Security: Security for Whom?” 257. 
35 As summarized by: Benjamin K. Sovacool, “Exploring the Conditions for Cooperative Energy 
Governance; A Comparative Study of Two Asian Pipelines,” Asian Studies Review 34, (Dec 2010): 506. 




Burma, with the increase of oil and gas revenue, can somewhat resist the 
pressures of the international community. By making alliances with China and India, the 
Burmese military junta functions in relative autonomy. The military junta realizes the 
potential of its vast oil and gas reserves, often cited as having “6.5 trillion cubic feet (cf) 
of gas from the Shwe gasfields in the Bay of Bengal” alone.37 The relationships between 
many of the countries in Southeast Asia are already strained by “intensive interstate 
rivalries over oil with themselves and regional super powers such as China” and often 
complicated by the regional priorities of China and India.38 The strong relationship 
between Burma and China allows them to somewhat resist international pressure and 
respond to regional security demands. 
Domestically, Burma reinvests very little of its oil and gas revenues into the 
infrastructure of the country. That is, the people of Burma are not benefiting from the 
immense revenue that pours into the country. It is estimated that some “ninety percent of 
the people in Arakan and Chin states use candles for light and firewood as their primary 
source of cooking fuel.”39 Ironically, this region of Burma has one of the largest reserves 
of natural gas deposits in the country.40 Even worse, evidence of human rights abuses, 
mostly of workers on pipeline projects, has surfaced in Burma. Smith and Htoo illustrate 
the forced labor conditions associated with the Yadana Pipeline project that has been 
ongoing since 1991.41 
The disparity between the revenue of the Burmese state-owned oil corporations 
and the poverty of Burmese people is a key point in identifying Burma as a possible 
rentier state in Southeast Asia. Beblawi identifies four general characteristics of a rentier 
state, one of which fits very well when addressing Burma. While Beblawi concentrates 
most of his evaluation of rentier states in the Middle East, his principles are applicable to 
                                                 
37 Petroleum Economist, “China and India battle for Myanmar’s gas,” (May 2006): 17–18. 
38 Benjamin K. Sovacool, “Reassessing Energy Security and the Trans-ASEAN Natural Gas Pipeline 
Network in Southeast Asia,” Pacific Affairs 82, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 483. 
39 Smith and Htoo, “Energy Security: Security for Whom?” 251. 
40 Smith and Htoo, “Energy Security: Security for Whom?” 251. 
41 As detailed in: Smith and Htoo, “Energy Security: Security for Whom?” 230. 
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the situation in Burma because of the regime’s autonomy in domestic and foreign 
politics. The government of Burma is the principal recipient of the oil and gas revenue. 
The military junta, in concert with its state run energy corporations, manages that wealth 
according to its policies. The mere fact that the military junta controls the distribution of 
rents and the “economic power thus bestowed upon the few” characterizes Burma as a 
rentier state.42  
Like Beblawi, Ulfelder correlates the natural resource wealth of a nation with the 
probability that it will strive for democracy.43 In explaining this relationship, Ulfelder 
identifies two categories within the context of the rentier state concept: demand-side 
effects and supply-side effects.44 Of the two, the category of supply-side effects explains 
the situation in Burma the most clearly. In contrast to the demand-side effects wherein a 
“state reliance on rents reduces popular pressures for government accountability,” 
supply-side effects “allow governments to buy more effective internal security 
apparatuses…and discourage or squelch efforts to affect political change.”45 
Under the auspices of the Ministry of Energy (MOE), the Burmese regime, like a 
rentier state in the Middle East, receives a large portion of its revenue from external rent 
which “accrues directly to the state.”46 Burma’s GDP growth is largely due to the oil and 
gas revenues that it receives from exports. The U.S. State Department estimates that the 
predicted “2010 growth of 3.1%” is due to oil and gas revenues, which account for “over 
half of Burma's export receipts and foreign direct investment.”47 Burma’s resource wealth 
and demand-side effect alleviates any pressure on the junta to resolve some of the  
 
 
                                                 
42 Luciani, ed., The Arab State, 88. 
43 Ulfelder, “Natural-Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracy,” 995. 
44 Ulfelder, “Natural-Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracy,” 997. 
45 Ulfelder, “Natural-Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracy,” 997. 
46 Okruhlik, “Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition,” 295. 
47 U.S. Department of State, “Burma: Economic,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35910.htm#econ [accessed June 14, 2011]. 
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domestic and international pressures. With the oil and gas revenue from China and 
India’s investment, the Burmese regime operates in relative autonomy because it does not 
depend on revenue from civil society. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will attempt to address gaps in the current literature, specifically when 
addressing the effects on Burma’s domestic politics and foreign policy as a result of the 
energy security interests of China and India. Using the current information on how China 
and India are pursuing energy from Burma, this thesis will attempt to show that Burma 
exhibits the qualities of a rentier state. The current literature utilizes the concept of the 
rentier state mostly in explaining countries in the Middle East and Central Asia, not 
Southeast Asia. In this context, the revenue generated through oil and gas resources has 
allowed the military junta in Burma to somewhat ignore domestic and foreign concerns 
and operate with relative autonomy.  
Using the case study method, this thesis will examine the specific effects on 
Burma of Chinese and Indian efforts to achieve energy security. A case study method is 
best suited for this discussion, particularly because of its ability to illustrate elements of 
the cause and effect. The causes in this case are the strategic rivalry between China and 
India in an effort to establish energy security and their subsequent disregard of the effects 
their investments have in Burma. The effect is the impact on the domestic relations and 
foreign obligations the Burmese regime has chosen to somewhat ignore, such as human 
rights violations or adherence to strategic or regional security requirements. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis discusses the pursuit of energy security in Burma by China and India 
and its overall effects on the domestic and foreign politics in Burma. To systematically 
explore this relationship, this thesis will be divided into four chapters. Chapter I will 
introduce the main question, China’s and India’s rivalry in Burma as they seek energy 
security, and the application of the rentier state model to contemporary Burma.  
12 
 
The subsequent chapters of this thesis will examine these issues in more detail. 
Chapter II illustrates the current energy demand and energy competition in Asia. It will 
specifically focus on the energy demands by China and India, and on their current energy 
export agreements with Burma. Chapter III outlines the consequences for Burma’s 
domestic and foreign policies as a result of the energy interests by China and India. The 
chapter will describe how Burma qualifies as a rentier state within Southeast Asia and 
how it is able to somewhat resist domestic and foreign pressure for regime change. The 
concluding chapter will restate the hypothesis and present what the author surmises are 
the most important implications of this thesis’s findings. The findings will contend that 
Burma will become more of a security challenge for Southeast Asian nations and its 
allies. The revenue from China and India’s oil and gas investment preserves the Burmese 
regime. Their political autonomy allows them to somewhat ignore domestic and foreign 




























II. CURRENT SINO-INDIAN ENERGY SECURITY AMBITIONS 
AND COMPETITION IN BURMA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, we saw that energy security is becoming an integral facet 
of Burma’s national security objectives. Specifically, the central hypothesis of this thesis 
is that the Burmese regime’s autonomy will increase as its energy rent increases with 
Chinese and Indian investment. In this cause and effect relationship, Chinese and Indian 
energy security ambitions in Burma are the engine of Burmese regime autonomy and 
stability. For China and India, energy security has not only become a national objective 
but an additional point of competition between the two countries. Their need to secure 
energy reserves puts them politically and economically at odds. In the last two decades, 
China and India’s competition for energy security has been focused in Burma.  
This chapter attempts to answer the following question: What is the extent of 
China and India’s interest and investment in the extraction of energy resources in Burma? 
It also identifies some of the root causes of the competition between China and India. Its 
first two sections illustrate and discuss the type of relationship China and India each have 
with Burma. These two sections will also map the scope of the Chinese and Indian 
petroleum investment in Burma. The chapter concludes by discussing Burma’s 
perspective on the competition or cooperation of China and India. The final section also 
offers some general thoughts concerning the role and extent of the oil and gas export 
revenue in Burma.  
It is worth noting that it is difficult to find specific and reliable figures on China 
and India’s investments in Burma. All three countries are complicit in not disclosing such 
details. In particular, Burma’s regime is highly suspicious of disclosing any investment 
patterns that might give outsiders any insight into the scope of their operations. 
Nonetheless, there is indirect information available that can be mined for such insight. I 




The demand for energy in Asia is growing exponentially. A 2011 State 
Department Public Affairs document projects that “if Asia continues its current 
trajectory, the region will likely account for nearly one-half of the expected growth in the 
world oil demand between 2008 and 2030.”48 In particular, the growing economies and 
populations of China and India are placing an incredible strain on the domestic energy 
resources of their respective countries. Leaders recognize that diversity in energy supply 
will strengthen their economic and political stronghold in the region. In general, their 
consensus is that a country that relies on a few sources of energy risks being at the mercy 
of those suppliers and comprises the security of its economic, political, and military 
agendas. Energy security is thus closely tied to national security, and can even be 
considered an aspect of it. 
Merging the elements of security and energy is a concept that has garnered more 
attention in the last few decades, accompanying the general realization that energy 
resources such as gas and oil are becoming scarce. But many of the newly discovered gas 
and oil deposits are in politically tenuous and unstable regions of the world. Increased 
demand plus restricted supply drives many governments to re-evaluate this heightened 
risk; they stretch beyond their borders and political comfort zones to secure access to a 
cheap and diverse supply of oil and gas, thus establishing energy security. 49  
Although the intensity of the dynamic is new, history is peppered with instances 
in which a country has sought to establish energy security. One of the most notable 
examples is the decision by Winston Churchill in the early 1900s to replace coal with oil 
as a fuel for the British Fleet. In his role as the First Lord of the Admiralty for Great 
Britain, Churchill endeavored in late July 1911 to prepare the British fleet to meet the 
German navy in a maritime confrontation, an “inescapable day of reckoning.”50 He 
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reasoned that the risk of pursuing oil in the “distant and insecure oil supplies in Persia” 
(present day Iran) was outweighed by the oil’s promise of “strategic benefits… of greater 
speed and more efficient use of manpower.”51 Moreover, Churchill saw that oil would 
not only improve the operational ability of the British Fleet, but also diversify the energy 
supplies of the British Empire.52  
Churchill’s decision to pursue oil in Persia in 1911 is worth noting for two 
reasons. First, it is a clear example of how the commodity of oil is “intertwined with 
national strategies and global politics and power.”53 Second, it provides some context, 
albeit in a simplified form, for understanding how more recent leaders integrate their 
understanding of energy concerns with economic, political, and military security 
priorities. The challenge that Churchill faced in the early 1900s is not dissimilar to that 
faced by contemporary China and India. China and India are “two of the fastest growing 
economies in the world… (and) are expected to consume a substantial share of the 
world’s energy resources in the coming decades.”54 The pursuit of energy security is an 
important component of China’s and India’s national strategies and shapes their political 
and economic decision making process. 
The competition between China and India, specifically over energy, has regional 
implications for security. These countries have practiced an energy resource tit-for-tat, 
seeking a competitive advantage in securing energy supplies. They use the full array of 
their diplomatic and economic “arsenal” in securing energy supplies with the “overall 
strategy to forge closer strategic and political ties with oil-rich countries.”55  In most 
instances, both countries directly compete for energy contracts in which the “winner 
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often has to offer a higher price.”56 For example, in August 2005, China outbid India by 
“$4.18 billion…and successfully bought PetroKazakhstan Inc., the third largest oil 
producer in Kazakhstan.”57 China was able, at least in this instance, to outmaneuver India 
and secure a valuable energy supply.  
Sino-Indian competition is not entirely centered on the pursuit of energy, and the 
geopolitical facet of their overall competition is a clear illustration of the dynamics 
between the two countries in the region. Politics and economic interests are inseparable 
and “there are still considerable strategic misgivings between the two countries that 
hamper bilateral cooperation in the energy sector.”58 Yet, as Chatterjee contends, both 
countries have realized that the “lack of energy cooperation…will not only impair their 
own energy security, but may also have negative implications on regional stability, as has 
happened in the case of Sino-Japan relations.”59 The intricate and often despairingly 
political dynamic between these two countries is best exhibited by their energy interests 
in Burma. 
Burma has always in some sense been a focal point of political and economic 
interest or contention. Starting in 1820, the British colonial empire absorbed Burma into 
British India through a series of three expensive and contentious Anglo-Burmese Wars. 
The British held direct rule over Burma until 1948, when it granted the country 
independence. During this long colonial period, Burma was squeezed of natural 
resources, often at the expense of the local populace. The priority for the British in 
Burma was twofold. First, they sought to benefit from the revenue from the sale of 
natural resources such as lumber and rice. Second, they hoped that their presence in 
Burma would provide a regional and strategic counterweight to the expanding French 
colonial presence in Southeast Asia.  
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In contemporary Burma, China and India pursue the same priorities: resource 
extraction and regional dominance. Their approach toward Burma is both comprehensive 
and competitive in their political support of the Burmese regime.60 Their support of the 
current regime is merely a choice of strategic benefit as they have “supported the 
Myanmar government’s seven-step roadmap to democracy and strongly opposed Western 
sanctions against Myanmar.”61 China and India have chosen in many instances to ignore 
questionable actions by the Burmese regime, specifically in domestic politics, in order to 
gain lucrative oil and gas contracts. 
China’s specific approach toward Burma is characterized by its “principle of 
noninterference in the internal affairs of Myanmar.”62 While their relationship can be 
described as “multidimensional” in their political and economic policy approach, the 
focus of the Chinese government on extracting oil and gas reserves out of Burma is 
singular in nature and has reached an “operational phase.”63 A recent notable example of 
this increased engagement is the “March 26, 2006 agreement on the construction of a gas 
pipeline” through Burma.64 The construction of the pipeline signals China’s monetary 
and political investment in the Burmese oil and gas supply.  
In contrast, India has throughout the years “gradually adjusted its policies toward 
Myanmar, shifting from idealism to realism.”65 The Indian government continues to 
compete for oil and gas contracts in Burma, but has been frustrated with the progress of 
agreements with the military junta. For example, “in mid-January 2005 the energy 
ministers of Myanmar, India, and Bangladesh reached an agreement in principle on 
constructing the pipeline” from Sittwe (Burma) to Kolkata (India) through Bangladesh, 
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but once again lost the bid to China.66 Aside from these incremental setbacks, India’s 
“pipeline diplomacy” remains a core facet of their foreign policy in Burma.67  
1. Chinese Energy Security Interests in Burma 
China’s appetite for energy has significantly grown throughout the recent years. 
In late 2010, “China’s energy import dependency had already amount(ed) to 50% of its 
total consumed energy, and according to some sources, even 60% or higher.”68 Steady 
increase in population and staggering economic growth has “produced voracious energy-
gobbling industries which devour electricity and fuels…and automobiles and modern 
apartment buildings that consume growing quantities of gasoline and heating oil.”69 The 
importance of establishing a consistent and reliable supply of energy is intricately tied to 
the infrastructure of the Chinese economy. The economy depends on this growing 
infrastructure, which in turn depends on a consistent and reliable supply of energy. 
An increase in economic growth and consumption thus forces the Chinese 
leadership to weigh the importance of energy security, adopting a strategy to combat the 
potential shortfalls of a dwindling energy supply. “Zheng Bijian, a senior advisor to 
Chinese President Hu Jintao, listed the shortage of resources as the first of three 
fundamental challenges to China’s peaceful rise in the twenty-first century.”70 By 
shifting from a “net petroleum exporter to a net importing country” in the early 1990s, 
China has attempted to narrow the “gap between domestic supply and demand.”71 
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China’s demand for energy has been estimated to “reach 11 million barrels a day, (and) 
natural gas consumption will more than triple, to 3.6 trillion cubic feet annually.”72  
The Sino-Burmese relationship arose when Burma sought stronger relations with 
its neighbors, particularly after a series of sanctions by the West that lasted until 1988 
when the threat of communism became lower.73 The Burmese Prime Minister Ne Win 
visited China and “began working to improve diplomatic relations with China in October 
1970,” solidifying a border trade agreement in 1988.74 A series of factors contributed to 
the inception of the growing relationship between China and India, including similar 
challenges from prodemocratic and anti-communist movements.75 Their similar 
approaches to governance illustrated to the Chinese that Burma was a possible ally in the 
region. 
The Chinese characterize the relationship with Burma as close and strong. It has 
been referred to with “Paukphaw, a Myanmar word for siblings,” a term the Burmese 
reserve for their relationship with the Chinese.76 But the International Crisis Group’s 
Asia Report on China’s Myanmar Dilemma notes that “the relationship between China 
and Myanmar is best characterized as a marriage of convenience rather than a love 
match.”77 The Sino-Burmese relationship can be summarized as a cordial business and 
political relationship, with both parties understanding that the “dependence is 
asymmetric.”78 In the eyes of the international community, the Sino-Burmese 
relationship is not appropriate because of China’s lack of engagement with Burmese 
politics and foreign relations; outsiders think that China should instead use its leverage to 
challenge the regime on human rights issues. China instead continues to insert venture 
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capital into Burma, adopting a “gradual adjustment of policy by a strong central 
government.”79 China is thus able to “protect its economic and strategic interests in the 
country.”80 
China’s initial investment in Burma corresponded with the “September 18, 1988, 
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) seiz(ure) of power in a stage-
managed coup d’etat.”81 The new military junta leadership in Burma opened up the 
“economy to foreign business” and China was a principal benefactor.82 Throughout the 
years, China has increasingly invested in Burma in the form of oil and gas infrastructure 
such as pipelines. “One study by the Burma Project published in September 2007 found 
more than 26 Chinese multinational corporations involved in more than 62 hydropower, 
oil and gas, and mining projects in Burma.”83 The number of Chinese companies in 
Burma illustrates the degree of investment that China has in Burma.  
Chinese oil and gas investment in Burma represents a significant amount of 
revenue for Burma. As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the exact amount of 
oil and gas revenue and investment in Burma by China is difficult to ascertain. “Chinese 
economic assistance and cooperation programs are usually tied to Chinese state-owned 
enterprises, and are therefore often indistinguishable from state commercial investments.” 
84 This arrangement is perhaps an effort to hide the strategy or intentions of the Chinese 
and their relationship with the Burmese regime from the international community and 
regional competitors such as India.  
David O. Dapice, Thomas J. Vallely, and Ben Wilkenson, in Appendix B of their 
report on Revitalizing Agriculture in Myanmar estimated the revenue from natural gas 
production. The revenue figures that the report presents are estimates that take into 
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account the general price per thousand cubic feet (tcf), the price of production associated 
with royalties and tariffs, and the transit fees.85 The report shows that gas exports to 
China from Burma are an estimated “$3 billion a year” with the price of production 
“$1.28 billion more in two years” and additional revenue for transit fees hovering 
between “$100 million and $170 million,” depending on capacity.86 According to this 
report’s estimates, we can surmise that the average total revenue for natural gas exports 
from Burma to China is $2.27 billion per year. 
The revenue and investment figures illustrated in the National Bureau of Asian 
Research Report, Pipeline Politics: The Intersection of Demand, Energy Markets, and 
Supply Routes, shows investment from the perspective of pipeline infrastructure and 
investment. Bo Kong, in his article on the geopolitics of Myanmar-China energy 
relationship, cites a number of figures that hint at the extent of investment in Burma by 
China.87 Kong notes that “by September 2008, Chinese (national oil companies) NOC 
had acquired twelve hydrocarbon projects in Myanmar.”88 It also acquired a total of 
twelve offshore and onshore blocks, or groupings of tracts of land or sections leased for 
excavation. 89 In the Burmese case, the Chinese were able to secure leases for blocks that 
will give access to vast gas reserves estimated to be “from 10.1 to 17.5 trillion cubic 
feet.”90  
This revenue is significant in its potential for the development of infrastructure. 
The Chinese NOC’s will need to invest a considerable amount in Burma in order to 
harness the natural gas reserves. Pipelines, port facilities, and deep water drilling 
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platforms will be some of the infrastructure required. Both China and Burma stand to 
benefit from this investment. Burma in particular will receive a “handsome and stable 
source of income.”91 Kong estimates that the pipelines will “likely generate about $1 
billion or more in annual revenue for Myanmar’s government over 30 years, which is an 
annual payday equivalent to one-third of the country’s existing foreign exchange 
reserves.”92 In turn, China will continue to absorb almost “11% of Myanmar’s total 
exports” and the oil and gas component will ease China’s demand for energy.93 
Recently, the Burma Environmental Working Group (BEWG) published a report 
on environmental issues concerning Burma.94 Of particular interest was the impact of 
multi-national companies on the environment; because those companies often represent 
the interests of various host governments, the report contains useful data on Chinese 
investment in energy resources. The authors concluded that “Chinese companies have 
invested $8.2 billion USD in the resource sector in March 2010 alone, including $5 
billion in hydropower, $2.15 billion in oil/gas sector, and nearly $1 billion in mining.”95 
Additionally, Burma has benefited from a “30-year interest-free loan (from China) in 
September 2010 amounting to 30 billion Yuan (4.2 billion USD)…for economic 
development.”96 In short, the revenue and investment figures presented by the Harvard 
Kennedy School Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, the National 
Bureau of Asian Research, and the Burma Environmental Working Group (BEWG) show 
a trend of significant investment and energy associated revenue in Burma by China.  
This investment reflects China’s growing concern about “overall dependence on 
the Strait of Malacca” and the security pitfalls associated with reliance on a single 
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source.97 The relationship between China and Burma also reflects China’s growing 
concern that energy resources are rapidly dwindling, and their decision that diversity in 
energy supply is an important national security objective. In this Sino-Burmese 
relationship, China is able to mitigate the potential energy depletions and the Burmese 
regime benefits from the increase in revenue and investment in their country. With oil 
and gas revenue and investment estimated between $1.2 billion to $8 billion, the military 
junta is able to ignore outside pressures and remain autonomous in its domestic and 
foreign policy decisions.98 
2. Indian Energy Security Interests in Burma 
India’s recent relationship with Burma on energy policies has developed in a 
gradual and measured fashion. The colonial history India and Burma share brings to the 
surface mixed feelings on how to act politically and economically in the modern era. In 
November 2011, Suu Kyi, one of Burma’s most respected prodemocracy leaders and 
harsh critic of the current military regime, commented that she was “saddened” by India’s 
recent energy contract dealings with the Burmese regime.99 Suu Kyi invoked historical 
post-colonial dynamics, indicating to the Indian Express newspaper that she thought 
“India would be standing behind us (Burma)….that it would have followed in the 
tradition of Mahatma Gandhi and (India’s first prime minister) Jawaharlal Nehru.”100  
India’s energy security is a critical component of its national strategy. The 
population of India amounts to an estimated “16% of the world’s population.”101 But the 
country only has “0.4% of the world’s oil reserve” to support the energy consumption of 
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the high population.102 India must therefore import a considerable amount of its oil which 
currently is estimated at 75 percent and according “to an estimat(e) by the International 
Energy Agency, by 2030, India will need to import 91 percent of its total oil demand.”103 
India relies heavily on its ability to secure energy reserves and supplies outside of its 
borders. 
Yet even with this demand for import oil, India was still initially hesitant in its 
engagement with Burma. The relationship started to become focused in 1988 and is 
characterized by scholars and policy makers to have evolved from “more pragmatic to 
less moralistic.”104 Initially, that is, India was quick to condemn the domestic policies of 
the neighboring Burmese regime. As a result, the relationship between the two countries 
suffered and long standing disagreements concerning border disputes, the treatment of the 
Indian diaspora population in Burma, and trade were aggravated.105 However, India’s 
“state socialism gave way to economic liberalism” and national policy became more 
focused on establishing itself as a regional influence in Southeast Asia.106 
It was not until the 1990s that the Indian government started to court the Burmese 
generals and jockey with China for resources in Burma.107 It is important to note that 
India engaged with Burma in part because the Indian elite saw that China was gathering a 
significant foothold in Burma. The historical tie India has with Burma, as well as the 
strategic location of Burma in Southeast Asia, precipitated India’s engagement policy 
with the military junta. Countering China’s oil and gas investment and interest in Burma 
is reflected by the 2003 comments of the former Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran 
that India’s “closer political, economic, and other ties with our neighbors in South Asia is 
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a high priority.”108 Oil and gas investment and interest in Burma is one vehicle by which 
India is able to not only increase its oil and gas import supply and diversity, but provide a 
counterweight to the growing Chinese presence in South Asia.  
India’s investment in Burma has been derailed in a number of instances by 
Chinese counteroffers, and by the failure of Indian and Burmese bureaucracy and 
negotiation. Indian and Chinese energy security policy is very similar.109 India, in its 
quest to fulfill the tenants of its Look East policy, intends to satisfy its thirst for energy 
while remaining an important partner for engagement in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, 
the results of many of its energy investments in Burma have been opaque and not very 
fruitful. One notable example was the memorandum of understanding in 2005 by the 
energy ministers from Burma, India, and Bangladesh.110 The ministers agreed to work 
closely “pledging to cooperate in a project to pipe (gas deposit) Block A1’s natural gas 
output to India across Bangladesh.”111 However, the “negotiations stalled” and an 
agreement could not be solidified specifically because India refused to concede on a 
number of Bangladesh requirements, one of which focused on the placement of the 
pipeline.112 The gas deposits at the A1 site identified as Sittwe are significant and would 
have eased the current energy demand by India.  
The loss of the A1 pipeline project in 2005 was a negative milestone for India and 
often referred to as a failure in regional engagement by many Indian policymakers. 
India’s refusal of many of Dhaka’s requirements for pipeline locations symbolized a key 
challenge India faces in securing energy resources in Burma: “governmental and 
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ministerial failure to coordinate and cooperate.”113 In this instance, the internal 
disagreement between the ministries of External Affairs, Defence, Commerce, and 
Development of the North Eastern Region concerning the priority and security of the 
India-Myanmar pipeline delayed any timely final decision to proceed and provided an 
opportunity for China to secure a quick deal with Burma.114 India’s engagement with 
Burma, although positive in aspects such as military exercises and joint counter extremist 
operations, is severely hindered when it comes to energy security initiatives. 
Therefore, India’s oil and gas investment in Burma is small compared to the 
Chinese investment. Currently, a third attempt at accessing Burma gas reserves has been 
agreed upon between the Burma’s state energy companies and their Indian counterparts 
and “India has been given the right to build, operate, and use an offshore hub” connecting 
“Mizoram in India and Sittwe in Myanmar.”115 The northeastern portion of India will 
benefit from acquiring energy from this offshore hub and will gain increased “access to 
international trade and bilateral trade.”116 Through state-owned energy companies, Oil 
and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and the Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL), 
India currently has a “30% stake in the exploration of and production from the offshore 
natural gas fields in Sittwe.”117 This is an important step for India: the investment in 
Burma will not only strengthen ties between the two countries but also alleviate some of 
India’s energy concerns. 
Indian investment in the oil and gas industry in Burma has been increasing 
recently. Xinhua News reported that “the ONGC and GAIL companies will add 832.54 
million dollars and 664.7 million dollars in block A-1's Shwe field and Shwe Phyu field 
and block A-3's Mya field projects respectively in addition to the present 115.77 million 
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dollars and 56.79 million dollars.”118 Additionally, the report indicated that this was part 
of “the gas exploration and production in the two blocks are undertaken by a consortium 
led by the Daewoo International with 51 percent of stake, also shared by ONGC of India 
with 17 percent, GAIL of India with 8.5 percent, Korea Gas Crop with 8.5 percent and 
Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) with 15 percent.”119 The total revenue and 
investment for Burma by India is estimated to be approximately $1.6 billion.120 
Indian investment and relationship with Burma nonetheless remains behind that of 
China because India started to politically and economically engage Burma at a later date 
than China. Therefore, much of the current agreements and oil and gas investment India 
has with Burma is still in the developmental stages and small scale. However, India does 
have a significant bilateral trade relationship with Burma. Currently, India is the “fourth-
largest trading partner with Myanmar” and the “second-largest export market for 
Myanmar.”121 The revenue generated by Burma from the bilateral trade agreements with 
India in general are regarded as “in favour of Myanmar.”122 The current investment phase 
and relationship with Burma illustrates the pragmatic approach.123 India chooses to 
ignore some of the oppressive civil policies of the Burmese government. In turn, India 
has gradually eased itself into the current resource grab in Burma adding themselves to 
the mix along with China and Thailand. The outcome will prove fruitful for India, but 
India must continue to adhere to its goal of “constructive engagement” with Burma.124 
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This chapter illustrates the specific energy security relationships China and India 
each have with Burma. As the chapter shows, China and India each have a different role 
and level of success in their respective dealings with Burma. What can be generally 
surmised from the revenue figures in this chapter is that China, of the pair, has a better 
and more productive relationship with Burma. The oil and gas revenue and investment by 
China amounts to $1.2 billion to $8 billion, whereas India’s contribution is conservatively 
estimated as $1.6 billion.125 This contrast is due to the cordial relationship between China 
and Burma. The relationship affords China unprecedented access to the oil and gas 
contracts, energy reserves, and infrastructure in Burma. 
The intent of this chapter was also to provide a causal basis for testing the 
hypothesis of this thesis: as energy rent grows in Burma from Chinese and Indian 
investment the military junta’s autonomy increases with respect to domestic and foreign 
politics. With energy rent from China and India alone reaching upwards of $8 billion, the 
military junta in Burma is benefiting very much from the energy resources organic to 
their country. The amount of investment in Burma by China and India also points to 
another key dynamic in Burma: China’s and India’s relationship in the region. China and 
India continue to compete for natural resources in order to offset their growing domestic 
demand for energy. The bidding for contracts between Chinese state run oil and gas 
companies and Indian state run oil and gas companies in Burma are key indicators of this 
competition. 
The geopolitics between China and India, within the context of Burma, brings up 
an important concluding question: Does it matter to the Burmese military regime whether 
there is competition or cooperation between China and India when it comes to energy 
security in Burma? Just as energy security is crucial to each country’s national security, 
“energy cooperation between China and India can never be separate from the political 
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relations between the two countries.”126 Therefore, the evolution of their relationship can 
affect, for better or for worse, the amount of investment and revenue generated for the 
Burmese military junta. Egreteau asserts that the Sino-Indian competition in Burma is a 
“mere quiet rivalry.” 127 I agree with this contention and assert more specifically that the 
Burmese regime will still benefit regardless of whether China and India cooperate or 
compete, and that the degree of their rivalry is not a deciding factor.  
The relationship between China and India has “improved significantly in the past 
few years, but there are still considerable strategic misgivings.”128 Their competition, 
within the context of energy security, has been relatively one sided but not without 
instances of cooperation. For instance in the Sudan, China and India agreed on a joint 
venture to extract resources from Chinese operated Sudan Greater Nile oil field wherein 
India “bought a 25 percent stake in this Chinese operation in 2002.”129 In Burma, the 
2005 venture to extract resources from offshore gas hubs was initiated by a consortium of 
stakeholders that included both China and India.130 In this instance, the two countries 
cooperated and the military junta benefited as well. In some instances, “oil companies of 
both countries have opted for cooperation in investing in (a) third country as a step for 
risk minimization.”131 
Likewise, when Sino-Indian energy interests compete, the Burmese regime still 
benefits in some form. In the December 2005 case, when negotiations stalled between 
India and Bangladesh over the specifics of the proposed pipeline project, the Burmese 
regime was patient and awaited the outcome.132 When the negotiations fell through, 
Burma was able to sell the rights to PetroChina and reinforce their already positive 
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bilateral trade relationship.133 The Burmese regime was naturally “aware of the 
advantages they can reap from negotiating prices when selling gas from the same field to 
more than one country at a time.”134 In Sino-Indian competition and cooperation alike, 
the Burmese regime benefits in revenue and investment. 
The Burmese welcomed their neighbors’ interest in their oil and gas. “Natural gas 
is (represents) Myanmar’s single most valuable export commodity.”135 In the absence of 
direct information, we can evaluate the amount of revenue that the Burmese regime 
enjoys in terms of foreign exchange reserves.136 It is estimated that the current reserves 
“have jumped at a rate of over $1 billion a year…and this is the same amount of net gas 
revenues now coming in each year.”137 Foreign exchange reserves could be “lent out in 
commercial terms” and improve the domestic infrastructure and production.138 Moreover, 
we can see that revenue from the oil and gas interests in Burma by China and India 
empower the military junta, providing a sizable portion of their GDP and export 
percentages. The cooperation or competition by China and India do little to hinder the 
Burmese regime. Rather both allow the regime to “diversify its foreign relations” and not 
be “drawn even deeper into the Chinese sphere of influence.”139 
Chinese and Indian interests in Burma have evolved throughout the decades at 
different speeds. The unique relationship the Chinese has with Burma has allowed the 
state run oil companies unfettered access to oil and gas reserves and contracts in Burma. 
India in contrast was hindered by its political opinions of the military junta, but their 
economic liberalization increased their political approach to the Burmese junta. India was 
able to become part of the consortium of neighboring countries seeking favor of the 
Burmese rulers. The competition or cooperation between China and India pose two key 
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positive points for Burma. First, Burma is able through its relationships with India 
provide a counterweight to the growing Chinese influence. The added political actor of 
India alleviates any concerns and paranoia that Burma has about being overrun by 
Chinese interests and infringing on their sovereignty.140  
Second, the Burmese rulers are able to diversify their export revenue and benefit 
from the long term investment and revenue which typifies any oil and gas projects. The 
Burmese regime is confronted on a regular basis with sanctions and requirements for 
democracy by the international community. With the diversity of revenue, the oil and gas 
component the most important, the regime is able to enjoy relative autonomy. 
Additionally, the regime is able to leverage the influence and standing of its powerful 
neighbors, China and India, in order to provide a political buffer between itself and the 
international community. High oil and gas revenue in Burma’s case encourages a 
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III. THE EFFECTS OF SINO-INDIAN ENERGY RENT ON 
BURMESE POLITICS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter II, my intent was to describe Sino-Indian energy interests and the 
revenues they produced for the Burmese government. I showed that China and India have 
made significant energy investments in Burma.141 Gaining energy security is an integral 
component of China’s and India’s domestic politics and national strategies. Most notably, 
in the last decade, each country’s policy toward Burma has evolved politically 
(increasing in degree of engagement) and economically (increasing in frequency of 
investment and commercial trade). Through their individual political policies, they seek 
to maintain positive and productive relationships with the military junta in order to retain 
access to oil and gas resources in Burma. Their desire to extract energy resources from 
within Burma, in turn, is an important and valuable tool for the Burmese military junta as 
it pursues its political policies. Specifically, the Burmese regime has been able to resist, 
repress, and otherwise defeat some of the domestic and foreign challengers who object to 
its oppressive policies.  
This chapter attempts to answer the following question: How, more specifically, 
does energy rent from China and India affect the military junta’s decisions in domestic 
and foreign politics? I argue two core points in this chapter. First, Burma is able to resist 
some of the domestic and foreign pressure for regime change because of the vast amount 
of energy rent reported to be “account for 40% of the total exports in ten years.”142 
Second, the military junta has leveraged the oil and gas investments by China and India 
in order to fend off some of the foreign pressure to undertake domestic political change. 
                                                 
141 The figures referred to in this sentence, $1.2 billion to $8 billion, is an average of the figures 
presented in this paper by the Harvard Kennedy School Ash Center for Democratic Governance and 
Innovation, the National Bureau of Asian Research, the Burma Environmental Working Group (BEWG), 
and Arakan Oil Watch. The average is meant as a generalization as to the extent of investment in Burma by 
China and India. 
142 As summarized in: Koji Kubo, “Natural Gas Export Revenue, Fiscal Balance and Inflation in 
Myanmar,” IDE Discussion Paper, no.225 (March 2011): 3.  
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Deploying the rentier state model, I show how the oil and gas relationship with China and 
India has greatly influenced the military junta on its domestic actions and strengthening 
its autonomy from international pressures. 
The first section of the chapter will provide insight into the evolution of Burmese 
politics starting from its independence in 1948. Since 1962, the Burmese regime has 
faced two main political opponents: prodemocracy groups and ethnic armies. These 
groups have sought to affect the junta’s policy decisions, specifically those concerning 
Sino-Indian energy security ambitions in Burma. The second section of the chapter 
introduces the rentier state model, and synthesizes three prominent behaviors I contend 
illustrate a rentier state. Section three and four will show specific instances of when the 
military junta leveraged its energy relationship with China and India in order to resist 
internal and external pressure to change its domestic and foreign politics. I apply my 
three core rentier symptoms to each of the instances in order to show the extent of 
Burma’s rentier-like qualities, and then use the symptoms to understand Burma better. 
The chapter concludes with some overall thoughts considering the implications of the 
relationship of China and India with Burma. 
B. EVOLUTION OF THE BURMESE REGIME 
The current regime’s approach to governance is a shift away from those embraced 
by the leadership shortly after achieving its independence from the British colonial 
empire on January 4, 1948. The first Prime Minister, U Nu, set a nonalignment policy 
that attempted to protect Burma from outside intervention. U Nu “sought to evade 
becoming enmeshed in the Cold War big power confrontation” and to preserve Burmese 
identity.143 The period of his rule (1948–1962) was also the period when the leadership 
came to understand that a political and bilateral trade relationship with China was 
important, particularly “because of its revolutionary policies and a border 
controversy.”144  
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General Ne Win took power in a coup in 1962, and while he continued the 
political tradition of nonalignment, he also shifted the national discourse to the need for a 
“resurrection of traditional Burma.”145 Haacke attributed many of the challenges that Ne 
Win encountered during his leadership to unresolved conflicts with under-represented 
ethnic groups in Burma and a communist insurgency that challenged the authority of the 
regime.146 The Saffron Uprising in August 8, 1988, followed by the September 1988 
coup, was the population’s response to the poor and ineffectual political and economic 
policies of the previous two decades. International distrust of the Burmese military junta 
and its political and economic policies had culminated in 1987, when Burma was 
“reclassified (by the United Nations) as a least-developed country.”147  
In a sense, the regime prior to 2010 embodied the philosophy and political 
evolution of the Burmese government since its independence in 1948. Mark Farmaner, in 
his article for the Democratic Voice of Burma, argues that a March 2011 speech that 
President Thein Sein made to Parliament indicates that this junta’s political and economic 
course is “recycled from his predecessors, Than Shwe and Ne Win.”148 Thein Sein 
asserted that the “motivation for economic change is strengthening the military and 
consolidating power, not tackling poverty.”149 Under all of these dictators, “no genuine 
reforms followed” new economic policies.150 The pattern that has been developing in the 
last few decades under military rule is that the government voices promises and 
intentions for economic and political reform but adopts only small concessions.  
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The military junta has contended politically with two main political pressure 
groups in the country: the National League of Democracy (NLD) and ethnic armies.151 In 
general, the discourse and relationship between the NLD and the military junta has been 
poor and unproductive. From the perspective of the NLD, “the political deadlock 
remained unresolved simply because of the military junta’s refusal to honor the results of 
the election in 1990.”152 For the military junta, the prodemocracy activists represented 
“the biggest mischief makers in the country.”153  At an impasse, both opted for a “zero-
sum approach.”154 Their lack of agreement periodically stalled domestic politics, often 
with violence and demonstrations. 
Conflict between “the (ethnic) Burman-dominated government” and other 
marginalized ethnic groups, such as the Karen and Shan, has played an influential role in 
domestic politics, and has done so since “immediately after independence.”155 The junta 
agreed to a ceasefire in the 1980s largely out of a realization that the external threat of 
communism had dissipated and successive military operations against revolting ethnic 
groups were pointless. Since then, the ethnic groups of Burma have sought to participate 
in the decision-making process concerning domestic politics. Their insistence on 
representation and meaningful participation, while a shift from earlier armed revolt, 
nonetheless continues to present a challenge to the military regime, obsessed as it is with 
maintaining internal security.  
In addressing Chinese and Indian energy security ambitions within Burma, the 
military junta continues to place a high priority on its priorities for regime stability with 
the goal of increasing revenue from oil and gas resources. Essentially, the regime exerts 
the same authoritarian control over energy contracts that they do over their citizens. It 
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controls and benefits from all aspects of energy contracts with the Chinese and Indian 
governments, including the revenue they bring. This has been the arrangement since the 
“Burmese oil industry was nationalized” in 1962 under Ne Win, and it excludes the NLD 
and ethnic groups from benefitting from energy rent. 156 In structure, the “Ministry of 
Energy set up Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) in 1963, and later established 
Myanma Petrochemical Enterprise, which operates refineries and processing plants, and 
Myanma Petroleum Products Enterprise, which handles the distribution of petroleum 
products.” 157 Again, all of these produce energy rent which flows directly into the coffers 
of the military junta. The Ministry of Energy is still the only Burmese player securing 
energy rent from China and India. As the recent 2010 report by Arakan Oil Watch makes 
clear, the joint Indian, Korean, and Burmese gas exploration contract was agreed upon by 
several state-owned oil corporations; of note, state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas 
Enterprise (MOGE) absorbed 15% of the project stake.158 
External to Burma, the core actors are China, India, Thailand, and the Association 
of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN as an organization is eager to gain 
legitimacy, and hoped to achieve it by incorporating Burma within its membership. But 
instead, Burma was one of the symbols of the ineffectiveness of ASEAN. Individual 
members, while outwardly condemning Burma for its lack of a civil society, has made 
concessions to Burma in the form of lucrative trade agreements. For instance, Thailand’s 
primary interests in Burma are to secure oil and gas deposits regardless of the policies of 
ASEAN or pressures from the international community. In the case of Thailand, a recent 
“$8.6 billion Italian-Thai development project in Dawei (Tavoy) in eastern Myanmar 
close to the Thai border has been agreed upon.”159 This is counter to ASEAN’s collective 
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hardline stance with Burma. Burma, unlike other countries in the region, has used the 
benefit of energy rent and exploration to ignore some of the international condemnation 
of their domestic policies.  
C. BURMA AS A RENTIER STATE 
Does Burma, through its reliance on natural resource revenues and use of 
authoritarian measures to maintain political control, exhibit the major characteristics of a 
“rentier state”? This theoretical model offers a way to analytically connect Burma’s 
energy policy with its domestic policies. Within the disciplines of political science and 
international relations, the term “rentier” names a state which relies on a “substantial 
external rent” that contributes a sizable percentage to the overall Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of the country.160 Beblawi contends that the rentier economy is one in which “the 
creation of wealth is centered amongst a small fraction of the society.”161 Likewise, the 
degree of involvement of the state in the economy is extreme: the state “plays the crucial 
role of the prime mover of the economic activity.”162  
The close and intertwined relationship between energy rent and state control is a 
key component of a rentier economy. Indeed, the term “rentier state” is often associated 
with oil and gas rich countries in the Middle East. Burma seems to fit this definition of a 
rentier state. The military junta enjoys a significant amount of energy rent from China 
and India, as well as Thailand, through the state-owned Ministry of Energy. There has 
been a significant increase in natural gas exports since 1998-1999 when revenue from gas 
exports was “nil.”163 Natural gas exports “rose to account for 40 percent of total exports 
within ten years, with an export value of USD 2.5 billion in 2007-2008.” 164 The steady 
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increase in natural gas export revenue has allowed the junta to remain somewhat 
autonomous from its domestic detractors and international pressure. 
Furthermore, in an 2008 report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the 
investments in the energy sector of Burma has steady increased from $200 million in 
2001-2002 to a high of $450 million in 2007.165 Additionally, there has been a steady 
increase in the percentage of natural gas exports since 2001 of nearly 5% to 40% in 2005, 
leveling off at 15% in 2008.166 The percentage of natural gas exports represented 40% of 
the total share of exports in 2008.167 The Burmese junta remains somewhat autonomous 
from its citizens because it does not need to rely on revenue from them in order to 
govern.  
But some scholars view a rentier state as an “abstract notion.”168 The academic 
community has offered a range of different definitive characteristics of a rentier state and 
its overall effects on the political process of a country. Beblawi, James, Moore, Schwartz, 
and Ulfelder each evaluate the rentier state from a different perspective, all in an effort to 
establish a theoretical norm. In general, authors agree that resource wealth negatively 
influences a country’s political development, and particularly retards the development of 
democratic institutions and processes.  
Ulfelder, in his article on the correlations between natural resource wealth and 
regime stability, seeks to identify “causal pathways …in the effects of resource rents on 
the durability of autocracy.”169 He contends that states that derive a significant portion of 
their rent from natural resources, or rentier states, are “less likely to transition to 
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democracy.”170 Ulfelder focuses his research on comparing quantitative indicators - such 
as regime duration, and the civil liberties index - to determine the likelihood that an 
autocracy will survive.171 
Burma’s statistics suggest that it might fit this definition of a rentier state. 
According to the Economic Intelligence Unit country report on Burma in January 2011 
the percentage of natural gas exports was 32.8% in 2009.172 Energy rent from China and 
India is estimated between $1.6 billion to $8 billion annually and is a sizable portion of 
the national income.173 Additionally, the democracy index referenced in the report, which 
takes into account civil liberties and political rights, estimates that Burma is only 1.77 
(authoritarian regime) on a scale of 1-10.174 While these figures may not directly correlate 
to the quantitative markers that Ulfelder presents in his research, they do provide a 
general baseline wherein some of his insights and conclusions can be used to identify 
rentier characteristics in Burma. The figures at the very least show some commonalities 
between Burma and the rentier states in the Middle East.  
Not unlike Ulfelder, Schwartz attempts to clarify the “intrinsic link between 
politics and economics in rentier states.”175 James also seeks to understand the connection 
between the revenue from natural resources and “nondemocratic political reforms.”176 
James contends that issues such as “low levels of citizen participation in public life and 
widespread abuse of power by the autocratic state” are common among resource-
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dependent states.177 Like Ulfelder, James employs social indicators such as the degree of 
“general education attainment” of the country’s citizens to gauge the effect of natural 
resource revenue on civil society.178 She concludes, in the case of Burma, that reform will 
only come from within the country and cautions that this is unlikely given the 
“geopolitical realities” that were in place.179    
Likewise, Moore attempts to describe how a rentier state behaves because of its 
dependence on rents and discerns seven pitfalls or “political pathologies” often associated 
with the behavior of rentier states.180 Some of the most glaring categories are: autonomy 
from citizens, absence of incentives for civic politics, nontransparency in public 
expenditure, and ineffective public bureaucracy.181 Moore posits that these seven 
categories are “strong indicators that oil rents tend to generate politics in which ordinary 
citizens have little influence, and enjoy less of the benefit from those revenues than one 
would expect.”182  
Many of the behaviors of typical rentier states illustrated by Beblawi, James, 
Moore, Schwartz, and Ulfelder overlap. Synthesizing this literature, I submit that there 
are three prominent political behaviors of rentier states: state autonomy from citizens, 
state immunity to external intervention, and a lack of incentives to democratize. I 
highlight these symptoms because they are the most useful in explaining the situation in 
Burma; they complete the equation between substantial energy rent (40 percent of total 
exports in ten years) and a regime’s political behavior (slow liberalization and 
democratization).183  
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D. RESIST DOMESTIC OPPOSITION 
How has the military junta behaved like a rentier state, resisted domestic 
opposition, and maintained regime stability? The Burmese regime is focused on retaining 
power and increasing its stability through its relationships with its powerful neighbors. At 
the same time, it places importance on the domestic stability of the regime. Their efforts 
have therefore been geared toward preventing their two main opponents, prodemocratic 
groups and ethnic groups, from gaining any traction in the political environment. I apply 
my three core behaviors of a rentier state to show the effect on domestic policy actions of 
the military junta and its connection to the energy relationship with China and India. In 
this way, I show that Burma exhibits the behaviors of a rentier state.  
The three examples are visits by Burmese junta members to China and India, the 
ongoing construction of a series of gas pipelines, and a Sino-Burmese railway project. In 
all three instances, the domestic actions of Burma have been influenced by the 
relationship between the military junta and China and India. The first example occurred 
in 2010, when China and India both invited the Burmese leadership to their countries for 
a four-day state visit. The visit to India that July involved “80 junta ministers and their 
wives,” showing substantial Burmese interest in India. 184 The general intent was for 
India to solidify its relationship with Burma and “counter China’s general regional 
influence.”185 The general consensus of the Indian government, the military junta, and the 
international community was that the Indians sought to increase energy project 
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example, India earlier that year had announced an investment of “$1.35 billion in gas 
projects in Burma” and their welcome to the Burmese visitors reinforced that initial 
investment.187 
Likewise, Burmese leaders visited China in October 2010 and focused on 
“boost(ing) economic ties,” particularly those concerning oil and gas projects.188 This 
visit, along with previous high level visits to China, culminated in a “total of 31 
agreements” regarding energy resource extraction in Burma.189 China also sought to 
counter the successful visit of the junta to India earlier in the year. The competition 
between the two countries to garner favor with the military junta manifests itself in close 
meetings and visits showing the importance each country places on Burma. 
The junta’s double visits to China and India had ramifications for Burma’s 
domestic actions on two fronts. First, it sought to “cement friendly” ties with both 
countries ahead of the November 2010 general election.190 It was “looking for China’s 
support for the junta’s (its) contentious nationwide polls” domestically, while India’s 
support was part of Burmese foreign policy’s “widespread diplomatic effort…across 
Asia.”191 China and India, recognizing the importance of their oil and gas investments in 
Burma, were eager to support the junta. It is significant to note that the international 
community condemned India for its relationship with Burma during this time. India 
responded that it could “certainly talk to a dictator in the east (who) is willing to look at 
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India’s strategic and economic interest.”192 For India and China, the oil and gas 
relationship with Burma outweighed international condemnation. 
Second, for Burma, the visits to China and India “cemented” their resistance to 
internal appeals by prodemocracy groups to hold legitimate elections in the country.193 
Despite pressure from the prodemocracy groups in the country such as the National 
League of Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi, the junta showed that there is a 
“lack of pressure to exchange political power for the right to tax, because revenue to run 
the state is readily derived from other sources.”194 Because the junta does not rely on the 
revenue from its citizens and has secured long-term funding from India and China, it was 
able to remain autonomous from its citizens and had little incentive to democratize. In 
2010, a nationwide election had not been held in almost two decades. The military junta 
did allow them in 2010 in an effort to persuade the international community that it had 
democratic aspirations. The junta put on a comprehensive public affairs campaign 
throughout Asia, dangling the promise of additional energy contracts to motivate the 
leaderships of China and India to affirm in the international venue their support for the 
elections. But the junta discarded the results. The voters had no recourse, and the regime 
remained somewhat immune to external pressure.  
The next two examples of Chinese and Indian energy investment ambitions 
affecting Burmese domestic policy actions are a series of pipelines that China and India 
are building in Burma, and a Sino-Burmese railway project. Construction of 
approximately 3,900 km in pipelines was started in June 2011. “The project involves 
state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation, India’s ONGC Videsh, and South 
Korea’s Daewoo International.”195 Additionally, the Chinese led construction of the $20  
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billion rail link between the Chinese border and the west coast of Burma could begin in 
December 2011. That project will be over 850 km and will follow the same pathway as a 
proposed gas pipeline.196 
In both the pipeline project and the railway project, the military junta was forced 
to contend with domestic opposition. In fact, the project provoked that opposition: “the 
decision to build the pipelines close to the rebellious border states of Kachin and Shan 
presented high risk of protracted conflict and severing energy supplies.”197 The junta 
deployed “more than 6,000 Burmese troops … to provide security” to protect its 
investment with China. But it also reignited a protracted conflict with ethnic groups. 
According to various NGO and press reports, in the construction of the pipeline the junta 
committed a range of “human rights violations, from beatings, forced labor and rape to 
unlawful imprisonment and forced eviction.”198 
The two domestic pressure groups, prodemocracy alliances and ethnic groups, 
became problems for the Burmese regime specifically with the pipeline project. The 
regime has focused its efforts on maintaining stability by using the energy investment 
from China and India to reinforce their efforts. Rentier-state symptoms such as regime 
autonomy indicate the capacity of a rent-strengthened regime, such as Burma, to be able 
to resist some of the pressure for democratization.  
The infrastructure revenue from this project, estimated to be $30 billion, enables 
the government to arm the Burmese military and acquire technology to monitor its 
opponents. 199 The extensive energy revenue from China and India in general allow the 
regime to deploy its substantial military capabilities against the ethnic groups, forcing 
them to comply with the state wishes. .200 It is important to note that “while exact figures 
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are difficult to come by, economists estimate that nearly 60% of the state budget is 
allocated towards military expenditures.”201 Much of the state budget, while difficult to 
discern, is being provided by the energy revenue from China and India. Protecting the 
pipeline projects benefits not only the junta but the military infrastructure. In contrast, the 
ethnic groups do not have comparable revenue from energy rent and military resources; 
“poverty remains an overwhelming life experience for most people.”202  
Because the junta benefits from the extensive revenue from energy rent it was 
able to ignore many of the objections the ethnic groups have concerning the placement of 
the pipeline. The junta operated within its own political frame of reference. It uses some 
of the revenue from Chinese and Indian energy projects specifically to protect those 
energy projects and their ongoing revenue. Its ability to move troops indiscriminately 
throughout the country without regard to the effects on citizens shows not only its 
autonomy as a regime but its immunity to some extent from external pressures to grant 
more freedom to civil society.  
E. RESIST FOREIGN OPPOSITION 
How has the military junta been able to generate diplomatic support and use its 
relationship with China and India as leverage in the international community? Paralleling 
these examples in domestic politics, there are two instances wherein the Burmese regime 
has leveraged its oil and gas relationship with China and India to delay pressure for 
change by the international community. In this section, the most glaring rentier-like 
behavior is the regime’s ability to be somewhat immune to external intervention. To 
some degree in both cases, Burma is able to escape pressure for political change because 
of the support from its energy rent partners, China and India. The two instances are: 
China and India’s cautioning of the United Nations against their war crimes probe in 
Burma in October and November 2010, and the joint Chinese and Russian veto of the UN 
Security Council Resolution against Burma in 2007. 
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In the first instance, China and India cautioned the United Nations not to pursue 
an official UN investigation into possible war crimes by the Burmese military junta.203 
The general consensus of the international community is that both China and India 
objected to the UN investigation on Burma’s behalf because of its extensive trade 
relations with the military junta. In particular, news reports in 2010 covering the issue 
indicated that China has a “vested interest in Burma’s natural gas reserves, being its 
number one beneficiary” and India “vies for the same natural gas resources as China.”204  
The second instance occurred on 12 January 2007 when China and Russia vetoed 
a UN Security Council resolution that would have required the Burmese government to 
adopt a democratic process, release political prisoners, and provide access to their 
country for humanitarian organizations.205 The double veto was the “first time since 1989 
that multiple votes have been used in the Council.”206 China in particular had a vested 
interest in defending Burma at the United Nations. During this time period, China had a 
well-developed bilateral trade relationship with Burma and defending Burma reinforced 
their cordial relationship. 
Indeed, China’s defense of Burma on the UN Security Council did not go 
unnoticed by the military junta. News sources and NGOs reported that oil and gas 
contracts were awarded to China “three days after” the vote and China used these 
contracts over a year later in the development of 900 mile pipeline “to take gas from the 
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coast of Burma to China.”207 Once again, the Burmese military junta was able to use 
China as a political buffer between themselves and the international community. 
Despite calls for Burma to adopt democratic principles, the regime has been able 
to ignore some international or external intervention. The military junta is able to do this 
because Chinese and Indian energy security strategies make them willing to provide 
diplomatic support for the regime in exchange for access to Burma’s energy resources. 
Burma is a key component of achieving this goal and Chinese and Indian investment in 
the oil and gas infrastructure is significant, roughly $1.2-$8 billion USD.208 The level of 
investment by these two countries indicates a financial and strategic commitment that 
cannot be casually discarded.  
Burma leveraged this desire by Chinese and Indian desire to extract natural 
resources in order to somewhat resist external intervention. By encouraging China and 
India to intervene on Burma’s behalf against the United Nations (UN) the military junta 
did not need to directly engage the international community. Instead it voiced its 
objections to external intervention through the actions of China and India. China and 
India are powerful forces in the international community and their objections to 
international issues are noted.  
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter illustrates the effects of energy rent from China and India on the 
domestic and foreign politics of the Burmese military junta. The military junta in Burma 
leverages the desire by China and India to extract resources as a method of resisting 
domestic and foreign pressures for change. The junta’s aim is to mitigate the effect of two 
core pressure groups in the country: prodemocracy parties and ethnic opposition groups, 
which disagree with the overall political and social course of Burma and the type of rule 
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that has been employed by the military junta. The energy rent from which the military 
junta benefits gives it an advantage in dealing with its opponents.  
The specific components and principles of what constitutes a rentier state are 
often debated in academic forums. In the second section of this chapter I presented a 
variety of approaches as to what constitutes rentierism. In general, the authors agree that 
resource- dependent states all share to some extent common political and social 
challenges such as a nonadherence to democratic principles, and a lack of a stable civil 
society.209 Based on their perspectives I gleaned what I contend are three prominent 
behaviors of a rentier state: state autonomy from citizens, immunity to external 
intervention, and lack of incentives to democratize. 
In that last two sections of this chapter I illustrated a number of instances wherein 
the military junta’s resistance to domestic and foreign policy stressors was mitigated by 
the oil and gas relationship it has with China and India. Because of the significant oil and 
gas investment both countries have in Burma, China and India are both eager to support 
the military junta regardless of international condemnation. What is at stake for China 
and India are the lucrative contracts for gas deposits in Burma that would meet their own 
domestic energy demands. For Burma, leveraging two influential regional powers 
provides political protection aimed at keeping the military junta in power. Chinese and 
Indian energy interests in Burma provide a fiscal basis for the military junta’s efforts to 
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In this study, I have sought to show how Sino-Indian energy security ambitions 
slow liberalization and democratization in Burma. I first showed that China and India 
have, in the last decade, invested in projects that generate revenue for the Burmese 
government. I explained that China has a close relationship with Burma and has benefited 
in the last decade from easy access to its energy resources. In contrast, I show, India’s 
relationship with Burma has evolved in the last two decades from, as Kanwal puts it, 
“more pragmatic to less moralistic.”210  I noted that determining the exact amount of 
energy investment by China and India in Burma is difficult, as all three countries are 
complicit in concealing the exact figures of their investments. However, there is some 
indirect information available which can be compiled to gain such insight. I was able to 
determine that China and India have invested $1.6 to $8 billion in energy related projects. 
Their mutual interest in Burma’s energy resources also points to another facet of 
their relationship in the region: rivalry. Each country seeks to alleviate demand in their 
country for energy resources, and must compete with the other for the resources in 
Burma. This competition is one aspect of the greater strategic rivalry between the two 
countries. Nonetheless, whether China and India cooperate or compete, Burma benefits. 
In the December 2005 India-Bangladesh pipeline case, for example, Burma patiently 
waited for the outcome, and when negotiations fell through was able to secure a contract 
with China.211  
The intent of Chapter III was to answer the following question: How, more 
specifically, does energy rent from China and India affect the military junta’s decisions in 
domestic and foreign politics? I argued that Burma has been able to leverage its oil and 
gas relationship with China and India to slow liberalization and democratization, and to 
increase regime stability. I also argued that Burma behaves like a rentier state. From the 
literature on rentierism, I synthesized three prominent behaviors of rentierism that I 
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contend Burma exhibits: state autonomy from citizens, state immunity from external 
intervention, and a lack of incentives to democratize. The significant increase in natural 
gas exports has risen from virtually nothing in 1998–1999 to 40 percent of the total 
exports for Burma.212 As noted, “when converted into the local currency at the prevailing 
market exchange rate, this natural gas export revenue amounted to 12.4 percent of GDP 
in 2007–2008.”213 The Burmese regime is able, because of the vast amount of energy 
rent; remain somewhat autonomous from its citizens and the international pressures. 
The Burmese regime achieved stability through two primary approaches. First, 
because it benefits from a significant amount of revenue from Chinese and Indian oil and 
gas projects in Burma, the regime is able to resist some of the domestic pressure to 
change. Throughout the last two decades, the military junta has had to contend with two 
primary pressure groups: prodemocracy groups and ethnic armies. But those groups have 
not been able to exert financial pressure on the government. Whereas citizens in other 
nations have power in part because their taxes give their government operating revenue, 
Burmese citizens have no such connections with their regime. 
Second, the military junta generates diplomatic support and has leveraged its 
relationship with China and India to fend off international pressure for political change in 
Burma. In the case cited in Chapter III, both China and India intervened on Burma’s 
behalf to halt or preempt an action by the United Nations. In both instances, the military 
junta rewarded China and India with lucrative oil and gas projects and contracts. The 
Burmese regime understood that China and India had to have continued access to the gas 
resources in Burma. The regime leveraged that need in order to remain internationally 
autonomous and maintain regime stability. 
It is important to recognize that some recent developments in Burma have 
changed the picture. During the course of researching and drafting this thesis, the 
Burmese regime’s actions have resulted in some notable milestones. First, in September, 
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Burmese President Thein Sein halted the Chinese-backed construction of the Mytisone 
Dam on the Irrawaddy River “because it was against the will of the people.”214 This 
decision is significant because it not only alleviates some of the prodemocracy and ethnic 
groups concern over the junta’s close relationship with the Chinese in Burma, but it also 
signals to the international community that the regime is attempting to allow the 
development of a more civil society. 
Second, within the international arena, Burma was recently awarded the 2014 
ASEAN chair. After the organization passed over Burma for the chair in 2006 because 
the international community condemned its repressive policies, it nonetheless scheduled 
for Burma to assume it in 2016; but the Burmese regime requested to be considered for 
the chair in 2014.215 The organization granted this request, signifying to some extent that 
ASEAN as an organization recognizes that the military regime has made some progress 
in adopting more moderate stances of governance.  
Equally significant is the visit to Burma by United States Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton in December 2011; she is the first U.S. Secretary of State to visit the 
country in more than five decades.216 The general intent of the visit by Secretary of State 
Clinton is to “explore whether the United States can empower a positive transition in 
Burma.”217 The United States’ interest in gaining traction within Burma perhaps is a way 
of offsetting the considerable influence China has in the region and in Burma. Burma, 
geographically, is in a strategic part of the region. I submit that the burgeoning 
engagement between the United States and Burma is not dissimilar to the relationship 
India and Burma started in the late 1980’s. Perhaps the United States is saying, as India 
did then, that any engagement is more beneficial than keeping the junta at arm’s length.  
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These recent domestic and international developments bring up an important 
concluding question: what is the projected impact of the continued Chinese and Indian 
energy investments on the Burmese regime? It is clear that China and India will continue 
to invest heavily in Burma’s natural resources. I predict that the Burmese regime will 
continue to make small incremental concessions concerning civil society and 
international engagement. The recent engagement with the United States indicates, at 
least at a small level, the military junta’s recognition that engagement with the United 
States is beneficial in counter-balancing the influence of China and India. We can see this 
dynamic at play within the region as well: while the regime has focused on developing 
ties with China and India, it has also benefited from the relationship it has with Thailand 
and other regional partners.  
Energy security is rapidly becoming an important consideration for many 
governments in the world as energy resources dwindle. The scope of this thesis is to not 
only illustrate the amount of energy investment in Burma by China and India, but also to 
evaluate how their pursuit of energy resources affects the Burmese regime. As access to 
energy rents continues to grow for the Burmese regime, it will likely limit the regime’s 
susceptibility to foreign and domestic pressure for further change, and therefore progress 
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